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

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A STUDY OF
THE RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS

BY

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KOREA (GRADUATE DIPLOMA 1930)

A. M., PACIFIC SCHOOL OF RELIGION, 1932

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A STUDY OF THE RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS

I. INTRODUCTION

In his admirable work, "The Psychology of Religious Belief" Professor Pratt depicts the universality and the perdurance of religion in a very dramatic yet very substantial way. "If an inhabitant of Mars(which let us suppose for the moment is an atheistic planet), should suddenly be transported to our earth and should make a tour of inspection, we may imagine his feelings of surprise and wonder at all sorts of institutions and ideas that would for the first time come under his ken....But the one thing," he continues, "which would fill him with amazement beyound all others would be the striking discovery that the inhabitants of this great land, almost to a man, believed, and with a good deal of firmness, in a being whom no man had ever seen or hoped to see, whose nature they could but dimly conceive, yet whom they must worship and love, - whom they called God.

"If our imaginary Martian should travel to other lands, his amazement at this fact would only increase....but go where he might, in Polynesia no less than Rome and in New York, he would everywhere be confronted with the same firm belief in some kind of superhuman being whom one must worship, supplicate and adore.

"If now to dicover the origin of this strange phenomen he should betake himself to the study of history, he would

learn with increasing astonishment, that history knew no more of the origin of this belief than he; because, as far back as one can go, not a race nor tribe is to be met with, no matter how primitive its ideas and its customs, that has been without this belief....This belief in something which man insists upon calling divine, would seem to him....to be one of the few things as natural to man as breathing."[1]

This description, although fanciful and imaginary as he himself confesses, seems to be true to the facts about religion. Formerly it was believed by some that there were nations or tribes which posses no religion or any sort of belief that may be called the basis of religion. But later this assumption was proved to rest "either on inaccurate observation or on a confusion of ideas,"[2] or prejudice. So today both students of religion and anthropologists are in accord in asserting that no tribe or race has been found without religious beliefs of some kind. "Hitherto no primitive people has been discovered devoid of all trace of religion"(Roscoff); "a people destitute of any religions has never been discovered" (Reville);"There is no need of begining to tell the most deraded of the people of South Africa of the existence of God or a future life, both these facts being universally admitted" (David Livingstone); these are some of the authoritive assertions made after careful observation and study confirming the fact of the practical universality of religion.

Modern scientific study further reveals that man was already possessed of a fully developed religion when he appeared in the dawn of history. One only needs to turn to the history of the most ancient peoples in history, - Egyptians, Babylonians etc, to verify this assertion. Religion started and was developing even in pre-historic times. "As early as the Mammoth age," says D'Alviella, "man practiced funeral rites, believed in a future life, and possessed fetishes and perhaps even idols."[3]

All this means that religion is not something that was imposed upon man, which does not belong to him in an organic way. In other words religion is indubitably and irrefutably natural to man. It is as natural to man as language is to him. He could not have been otherwise even though he tried. He is so constituted that he cannot help being religious. It is so rooted in our human nature that we cannot but be religious.

The value of religion in human life can hardly be overestimated. To be sure, it has been accompanied as have other human activities, with abuses and vilenesses which are most detestable. And yet this fact cannot negate the immeasurable services which religion has rendered to man. One does not refuse to recognize the value of science to human society for the reason that it has been wrongly used in killing hundreds and thousands of innocent people in war. It would be a most absurd thing to decline to admit the utility of language because it has been employed in cursing instead of blessing

and conveying one's good will to others. The same thing can be said about religion. We can trace in history, from the lowest stages of human civilization to the highest, most inhuman and vitious things done by man in the sacred name of religion. We must not, however, let this fact so blind our eyes that it will make us fail to see the dazzling, and beneficent life-giving sunshine which shines above and around us. Is it not true that man has ever attributed all the best ideals and principles of life he can conceive of to religion? And does not this prove that he has ever believed that religion stands for whatever is good, beautiful and true? If he has done things evil in religion's name, it was because his mind was not yet enlightened enough. If one stumbles in the day-light it is not because the sun is not bright enough, but because he is either careless or blind. So we could, without hesitation, declare that if there were in human society "love, joy, peace, longsuffering, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, meekness, self control," it was through the Spirit of Christ, who is the fountain of our abundant life, that they have their place in the human soul. It is through the empowering and inspiration of religion, that saintly men and women in the past hoped, loved, endured, were strengthened and conquered.[4] It is religion in the broad sense that beautifies, sweetens, heals, saves, liberates, vitalizes, forgives, unifies, reconciles, regenerates, and sanctifies humanity as a whole and

brings the city of God down to the human society and uplifts the sinful man to Him who is the Light, Life, Love, and All.

Religion as such is the vicegerent of the Creator-Father to fulfil His eternal aim. Despite all this incontrovertible boon that religion brings to us, there are those who discredit it on the accusation that it is based upon sheer illusion. There is not intellectual content, they hold, no objective reality upon which religion can stand. The so-called god or God is merely the objectification of the desires of men which they long to satisfy and which they have idealized and deified. Some have gone so far as to find the root of religion in perverted sexuality as has Freud. Some have advocated the view that religion is purely an invention of the state and priestcraft or the privileged class for the protection of their self-interest, etc, etc. To them, therefore, believing is practically identical with being deceived, for the religionists hold for real, they assert, what is not real. Granting that the religious belief is an illusion, I might quote Professor Buckham's admirable and convincing statement in answer to this fantastic and shallow theory, without making a detailed reply to it. "If this(belief or the experience of God) is an illusion," he argues, "there are three things that may be said of it: first, it is a singularly persistent illusion - other illusions give way, this one perdures through the generations; second, that it is a singularly well fortified

illusion - capable, as has been said, of the most thorough and convincing rational explication and defense(which amounts to saying that it is a reality of realities) - and third that it is a very wide-spread illusion, common to all races and peoples."[5]

There are some, like Comte, who discredit religion on the ground that it has been outgrown by modern men. It was a childish attempt, it is said, of the primitive, unenlightened people to explain the world around them. Consequently it has no value to us who live in an age of science. Religion as well as philosophy must give way to Exact knowledge. This is a theory held by those who are utterly ignorant of what religion is and stands for, and of human nature with its desire and longing for higher things, and who have no sympathy with, nor spiritual insight into, the deeper meaning of human life and the universe. If the electron and proton were the ultimate answer to the great riddle of the universe, Whence and Why? we could do without religion. But alass! our life's quest is too big, too high and too deep for science alone to give us satisfaction, and the universe is too mysterious and too complex for the answer that science gives to be an ultimate one. Hence the need of religion for life's supreme quest and for the fulfilment of the noblest human ideal.

We are not, however, fully justified in vindicating the place of religion in human life until we get, (1) a clear

knowledge of the nature of religion - for without the clear knowledge of the nature we have no sure grounds on which we can assert that religion is not what its detractors believe to be; (2) a concrete knowledge of the part it plays in human life. These, then, are the tasks that we are to engage in.

II. THE ELEMENTARY FORM OF RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS

Since the begining of the modern scientific study of religion, the students of religion have not only studied the subject by the comparative method, constructing the conceptions of religion upon a wide basis of data, indicating resemblances and differences between various religions, and revealing its universality and the working of God in the mind of every people under the heaven, but also they have investigated the customs of our remote ancestors to ascertain the origin and the character of primitive religion. As we have seen above it is fairly certain that there was religion in pre-historic times. Dr. Marett, one of the leading anthropologists to-day, after a careful observation of many prehistoric sites in France, drew a conclusion as follows:

> "A visit to certain pre-historic sites in France will suffice to pursuade us that there was rudimentary religion amongst ancient no less than there is amongst modern savages. At Niaux, for instance, there are pictographs and paintings which, so far as can be made, are connected with rites intended to secure good hunting. The fact, too, that they occur in deep within the dark recesses of a mountain, where a certain awe is felt even by a modern mind, afford an additional proof that solemnities were being celebrated....Again, at Gargas, the hand-prints stencilled on the walls possibly record some charm or vow. Our present knowledge does not enable us to establish the meaning of such symbols with any precision; but on the face of them they bear a close anolagy to those sacred designs which the Australians employ to-day in their magico-religious ceremonies."1

Without dwelling further on this particular problem, then, we will ask, How and why did men became what we call religious? What is the character of their belief? These,

of course, are not problems that can be easily answered, for, first of all we have a very megre, if any, data from which we can draw the desired answer. Secondly, this is a psychological problem, after all, which it is absolutely hopeless to solve when there is no longer subject to inquire and to examine. The only data we have in our hand are, as we have seen, a few scratches they made on the rocks in some ancient caves which suggest and indicate something about what they believed and did. But they only give us basis of inaccurate inference and nothing more. However, we are not entirely left without hope. We have in our own day the most backward modern savage people in Australia, in Africa, and in other places on the earth, whose manner of life and mode of thinking are so primitive and simple that we could hardly imagine a people under the sun less civilized than they. Now if we mean by the primitive people the childhood of the human race it would not be unreasonable to infer that they might certainly have been pretty near to the modern savage if not exactly the same. This is what Dr. Marett thinks when he says, "since backward conditions exist within the precincts of civilization, there are, doubtless, similar clues to be discovered even nearer home."[2] By studying the modern savage people,[3] therefore, we get some approximate knowledge of the workings of the mind and the ways of doing things of primitive peoples.

By this method, that is, by studying the savage of to-day, many modern scholars have found what the most elementary form of religious consciousness might be. However, the results from the study of savage people are not in entire accord with each other. We will see what they have to say about the most elementary form of religious consciousness among primitive people with a view to ascertain the most satisfactory answer.

1. Animistic Theory of E. B. Tylor. - This theory may be said to be the first sttempt to give an answer to the problem backed up by a thoroughly scientific study of the most backward people of to-day. Dr. Tylor present his view in his monumental work, Primitive Culture(first edition, 1871; third, 1891).[4] In it he proposes "the belief in spiritual beings" "as the minimum difinition of religion," i.e. the most rudimentary basis of religion. This belief in spiritual beings of souls, he called by the term Animism. According to Dr. Tylor, the childish primitive man sees in the natural phenomena around himself - in animals, trees and plants, and even in things which are inanimate, e.g. rivers, weapons, boats, food, clothes, etc. - souls like his own. To premitive man Nature is not dead. It is a living thing in itself or filled with spirits which are not fundamentally different from his. This notion of a soul in Nature was the way in which primitive man explained natural phenomena.

This belief in souls, then is at once his science, philosophy and religion.

How, then, we may ask, does this belief explain the emergence of the most rudimentary form of religious consciousness? The belief in spiritual beings whould not necessarily lead man to embrace the religious attitude. According to Dr. Tylor, "spiritual beings are held to affect or control the events of material world, and man's life here and after; and it being considered that they hold intercourse with men, and receive pleasure or displeasure from human actions, the belief in their existence leads naturally, and it might also be said inevitably, sooner or later, to active reverence and propitiation. Thus Animism, in its full development, includes the belief in souls and in a future state, in controlling deities and subordinate spirits, these doctrines practically resulting in some kind of active worship."[5]

As we see in this passage, then, the reverence for and propitiation of the powerful spirits in nature that are supposed to control the events of nature and man's life here and after form the starting point of religion. Nature worship in general had its begining in this belief in the spirits in Nature, e.g. the belief in the water spirit led to the water-worship; the belief in the spirits in or inhabiting in trees, to the Tree-Cult; and that in animals, to the Animal-worship etc. And the notion of common ancestorship with some parti-

cular tree or thing or animal, in most cases, an animal, led to Totemism or Totem-worship.[6] This belief in spirits naturally led to Politheism, e.g. belief in Heaven-god, Rain-god, Thunder-god, Wind-god, Sun-god, Moon-god etc. Such is briefly Tylor's Animistic theory.

The Animistic theory, however, is not primitive enough to be called "the minimum definition of religion." For the reasons (1) that, as Dr. Marett well says, this theory makes religion too intellectualistic, hence too narrow, and too advanced to be called the most rudimentary form of religious consciousness. Psychologically, religion, or the religious consciousness, involves more than thought. It involves feeling and will as well, especially feeling in primitive man. The religion of the primitive man was not so much the result of thought process as the spontaneous emotional response toward something or some power, mysterious and awe-inspiring. Psychologically and chronologically belief usually follows religious feeling of awe and reverence, although the awareness of something is not wanting in that experience. To quote from Dr. Marett again, "savage religion is something not so much thought out as danced out....which favor emotional and motor process, whereas ideation remains relatively in abeyance."[7] (2) The religious feeling of awe and reverence can be generated without the belief in souls. Among the Australlians the bull-roarer is a thing which inspires a genuine religious awe despite its want of aniministic colouring.[8]

(3) Furthermore, as Dr. Edwards insists, "not all the spirits which animate the objects of nature are worshipped or evoke religious emotion and action."[9] In order that religious feeling be aroused in man there must be some awe-inspiring quality in the object that he is confronted with. The spirits or objects in general which lack such quality were not worshipped by the primitive man. As quoted above, Dr. Tylor believes that, "the belief in their existence leads naturally, and it might almost be said inevitably, sooner or, to active reverence and propitiation....resulting in some kind of active worship." He, however, fails to give the psychological reason why the belief in spirits leads to actual worship. Furthermore the fact ought to be clarified too that if, as Dr. Tylor seems to assume, there was a time when the primitive man did not worship the spirits before he was led to "actual worship" why did he not worship them? The answer to these questions is very crucial in ascertaining the origin of religion. The answer to these problems, however, is not to be obtained from the bare belief in spirits which the primitive man held, but in something else which we shall have occasion to look at later. (4) One more reason is that the existence of magic, one of whose fundamental basis is the belief in spirits, and whose fundamental attitude is to control over and exploit the spirits rather than to revere and adore, is the fatal disclaimer against his theory that the belief in spirits "natu-

rally and inevitably" leads to actual worship. We may, then, conclude that Animism is not a satisfactory theory in determining the elementary form of religious consciousness, and that we must find it not in Animism but in something else.

2. Magic as the Root of Religious Consciousness. Sir J. Frazer, in his memorable work "The Golden Bough," defines religion thus. "By religion, then, I understand a propitiation or conciliation of powers superior to man which are believed to direct and control the course of nature and of human life."[10] From this definition he finds two sides in religion, namely, (1) "a belief in superhuman beings;" (2) "an attempt to win favor" from those beings, which "cleary assumes," as he puts it, "that the course of nature is to some extent elastic....and that we can persuade....the mighty beings who control it to deflect, for our benefit, the current of events from the channel which they would otherwise follow."[11] As we see from this words, then, his definition of religion is substantially the same as Dr. Tylor's. But what is fundamentally different is that while Dr. Tylor finds the root of religiousness consciousness in the belief in spiritual beings, Frazer finds it in magic. He insists that magic was prior to religion and that the latter evolved in some way from the former. "An Age of Religion," he says, "has everywhere been preceded by an Age of Magic."[12] But when men discovered the falsehood and barreness of magic which, they thought, was the cause of failure to achieve their aim sought,

they gradually turned away from magic to religion.

This theory contains some elements of truth when we view the history of religion as a whole. For there might have been occasions in the course of history when men failed to get satisfaction from magic and naturally turned to religion. But is this theory adequate to explain the origin of religious consciousness? By no means. For, first of all, can we imagine that a naive primitive man could have been so self-assertive and arrogant in the presense of awe-inspiring and in some respect dreadful high powers as to dare to try to control them in stead of prostrating before them? The sense of ignorance and weakness which, Frazer thinks, led him to a religious attitude, must have been present as soon as he began to be self-conscious as man. Certainly the sense of helplessness and self-abasement must have been stronger in primitive man than those who followed him. We find, then, in Frazer's theory, the anachronism of the psycholo y of primitive people. (2) Besides we find in the religion of the savage people that their religious ceremony is mingled with a considerable amount of the magical element. There is a very clouded distinction between the religous and magical element. As Dr. Marett well says, Magic and religion were not so differentiated in primitive life as we unually think ther were. They sprang from "a common plasm of crude beliefs about the awful and the occult."[13] They are two brancnes coming out of

one and the same stock, and we cannot say that either of them sprang from the other or is prior to the other. (3) Furthermore, Frazer's theory of the origin of religion is too egotistic and utilitarian. There is no element of spontaniety in the nature of man which he takes into account to explain the genesis of religious consciousness. So Frazer's theory also proves to be unsatisfactory.

3. Manaism. The unsatisfactory character of two preceeding theories have led many modern anthropologists to look for the most rudimentary form of religious consciousness in the theory that we might call "Manaism." The leading exponent, as a matter of fact, the first advocator of this theory is Dr. Marett, to whose work I have so often referred. Let us very briefly review what Manaism stands for. According to Dr. Marett, in his valuable and epochmaking work, "The Threshold of Religion," Mana, a Melanesian term,[14] is a power diffused, indefinable, and mysterious, conceived by savage people over a wide range, in whose presense they are struck by a sense of awe and reverence. This is a supersensual, hence a supernatural potency "distinct from physical power, which acts in all kinds of ways for good and evil," yet manifests itself in physical force, not infrequently in persons. It is "what works to effect everything which is beyond the ordinary power of men, outside the common process of nature." Hence, "if a man has been successful in fighting,

it has not been his natural strength of arm,...that has won success; he has certainly the mana....If a man's pigs multiply, and his gardens are productive, it is not because he is industrious....but because of the stones full of mana for pigs and yams that he possesses. Of course, a yam naturally grows when planted; that is well known, but it will not be very large unless mana comes into play; A canoe will not be swift, unless mana be brought to bear upon it, a net well not catch many fish, nor a arrow inflict an mortal wound."[15]

Now this supernatural power has two sides, negative and positive, tabu denoting the negative side, mana the positive. Negatively it is tabu because it is "not to be lightly approached." One ought to guard against casual, incautious and profane dealings with it. And yet it is not absolutely unapproachable for it has also its positive side which is operative in things and persons. And it is this positive side that makes a practical religion possible and draws men to it.

We must also note that this supernatural power in its rudimentary state has no moral connotation whatever. It is neither good nor bad. It is simply non-moral. It remains so until it is differentiated into an antithesis between magic and religion. Until then it is "common plasm," to use the same expression again, from which both magic and religion later sprang up. It may also provide "a basis on which an

animistic doctrine is subsequently constructed....Of such powers spirits constitute but a single class among many."[16]

Such is briefly the gist of Dr. Marett's famous Theory of Mana. From this careful study of religion of the savage people, he proceeds to define religion as having "the sacred" as its object, "and the corresponding religious attitude as consisting in such manifestation of feeling, though and action in regard to the sacred as is held to conduce to the welfare of the community or to that of individuals considered as members of the community."[17]

Manaism, then, to my mind, is the most satisfactory theory of the form of the elementary religious consciousness viewed from both the historical and psychological stand point, for these reasons. (1) We can conceive of no more rudimentary state of religious consciousness than this. Before the primitive man could reach the advanced conception of personal beings, i.e. spirits and souls, as religious objects he must have travelled a long way forward. Before he could feel aware that the religious object is some one he must have felt it vaguely as something, or some power which surrounded him and yet was so indefinite and mysterious that he dared not, and was not able to, name it. Dr. Marett seems to be in the right when he says, "Before Animism, regarded as an ideal system of religious beliefs, can have come into its kingdom, there must have been numberless dimly-lighted impressions of the awful that owned no master in the shape of some one sys-

tematizing thought."[18] (2) Manaism emphasizes the spontaneous emotional response on the part of religious subject, and as such it is more at home to the primitive man than other theories which tend more or less to trace the origin of religion in the thought life of the primitive man rather than in his impulsive reaction to the given situation. (3) Furthermore it is more inclusive in explaining the religious consciousness in primitive people, for as we have had occasion to note, Animism which is claimed by some as the most rudimentary form of religious experience does not cover the whole range of religious experience among the most backward people.

III. RELIGION, SOCIAL AND INDIVIDUAL

In the preceeding chapter we have seen that primitive man saw in his environment some mysterious, supernatural power, called mana, in whose presense he felt a sense of awe and reverence, and that that is the most rudimentary religious experience from which the higher forms of religion developed. How could primitive man, we might ask, conceive such powers, and what was the driving impluse that led him to have such an attitude of awe and reverence? In short how did he become religious? Is there in his mental makeup that which can explain this phenomenon we call religion? Or is it purely one that is produced in the natural course of his life in the trive or group? To put it another way, is religion a product of some sort of innate religiousity in the individual, or is it a social product?

The recent study of anthropology has shown that the primitive or the least civilized, man has a very megre idea of individuality. The unit of primitive life is not the individual person but the group, or the trive. The mental and emotional life of the individual is generally in keeping with that of the group. He has very little individual reflective and self-determining power. Hence his action as a whole is determined by the group way or customs and sentiments rather than by his own thinking and judging. Not only initiation into the tribe, protection from beasts and enemies, and war,

but also food-getting, marriage, birth etc. were to him not so much private and personal matters as tribal. As a matter of fact, a primitive tribe was not a collection of individuals each of whom has his own opinion, will, and ways of doing, but a compact company of homogeneous human beings. In such a group, or society, therefore, everything that one does is a matter of course emerging from, approved and practiced in, the group life as a whole. If he does anything which is contray to the ways of the group, he does it at the risk of his being cut off from the group, which the primitive dared not do. For this evident reason, therefore, many modern scholars firmly hold the view that, religion is a social product rather than the expression of innate religious instince. Let us see what they have to say about religion as asocial product.

Dr. Irving King, in his book "The Development of Religion," asserts religion to be a social product and denies most energetically the existence of a religious instinct, or innate nature, or sense, from which religion evolved. His argument is as follows.

Religion, or the religious consciousness, may be called a valuating attitude toward something real or imagined.[1] How, then, did the valuational attitude come to emerge in the primind? To determine this we must first know how the sense of value came to be in his mind. According to Cr. King, the sense of value is produced in a process of concious effort to

obtain a desired end. This is the very condition of the begining of the sense of value. When the activity is a mere instinctive or impulsive reaction toward the stimulus presented, there can hardly be any sense of value. It is only when the desired end is delayed and consequently various preliminary activities are performed that the sense of value is engendered.[2] And the context of the activities, he thinks, is of a definitely social character. Therefore the sense of value, thus engendered, is, after all, a social product.

In the next place, since we cannot regard religious consciousness as an instince, it may, he thinks, best be called an attitude. Now "by an attitude is meant an organization of various mental capacities in a definite way about certain situation, or problems of life."[3] Hence attitudes are correlated with the situation, or the objective conditions of the life-processess of primitive people, without which no attitudes could be generated. So the objective conditions are the matrix from which all the attitudes of primitive man evolve.

Of the objective conditions, or the social environment, certain conditions tend to produce a specific attitude that we may call religion. So the "chief problem of the evolution of religion," he asserts, "may then be restated as that of showing how situations affording opportunity for certain types of reaction has been built up." And " whatever may be possible in the way of an analysis of the mental attitude, per se, must rest ultimately upon some account of the objective con-

dition of its appearance."[4] So, to Dr. King, religion as a valuating attitude is through and through a social product.

Professor Ames also holds a very similar view to Dr. King's. But he approaches it from different standpoint. While Dr. King, as we have seen, finds the origin of religious consciousness entirely in the objective environment of the individual, Ames seeks it in the socialized individual. Denying the specific religious instinct as the origin of religion, he holds the view that religion, as other human activities, springs from the "needs, whats, wishes, ideal ends." Relgion is the "outreaching," he asserts "for the satisfaction of felt needs, and its expression in objects and ceremonials associated with these ends."[5] That this is true is proved by the fact that among primitive people their vital interests, e.g. the food objects and the activities involved in securing them and the defence against enemies etc. are the central concerns of their religion and are expressed in their ceremonials and rites.[6]

This "outreaching" for fundamental needs and desires becomes social because "men are so bound up with their fellows in this endeavor to fulfil their needs that the ends sought are common to groups of persons living together in family, tribe and nation."[7] A man who lives in such an interrelated socity, therefore, seeks and strives not only for his own satisfaction but also that of his offsprings, fellows

etc. The religious consciousness which has thus been engendered from the common interests of man, therefore, "is a most intimate phase of the group consciousness."[8]

It follows, then, according to Ames, that the sense of sacredness is derived from the objects that give satisfaction of desires, upon which their livelihood depends, e.g. the well, the flowing spring, the fertile land, sheep, the moon, the stars etc. "All these gained sanctity as they accumulated significance in the furtherance of life and well-being."[9] So to Professor Ames, human desire is the key to the emergence, development and also the consummation of religion.

Quite different from the two preceeding theories, and yet standing on the same footing, is Robertson Smith's theory that religion had its origin in the sense of kinship which is the basis of the entire sacrifical system and communal meal. He too postulates in the first place the compact solidarity of primitive society in which individuals are only parts, like branches of a tree. In such s society as this, the blood-kinship is the strongest social bond which binds them together in all the phases of life. This kinship is the thing that is regarded as sacred and calls forth religious reverence in primitive man. If the life of the kinsman was sacred, it was not because the life was sacred as such but because it was the kinsman's life. "A kinsman's blood was to him a thing holy and inviolable."[10]

The fact that the kinship was regarded as sacred is proved among other things by so-called totemism among primitive people. The members of the totemistic clan believed that a certain plant, or animal, or whatever else it might be, was the tribal ancestor or was of the same stock with the clan. This led the members to look upon it with profound veneration. No private slaughter of the totem animal was legitimate except on such occasions as a public festival, or sacrifice in which all the clan took part, because it was thought that the life of a kin animal is too sacred to kill privately. One the contrary no life was sacred if it was not that of the kin.

This kinship was not limited to one's fellowmen and animal or plant only. It extended to the god or gods of the clan. Gods had their place in the religion of primitive people only when they were regarded to akin with the clan. Strange gods had nothing to do with the sacrifice and rituals performed by the clan. It was not to every god that they knew of, that they made sacrifice and paid reverence, but to the clan god only.

All this proves, Robertson Smith thinks, that the basis of primitive religion is the sense of kinship, and that the "precepts of sanctity are covered by the principle of kinship."[11] The religion of primitive people, then, he calls the "religion of kinship."

In considering the socialogical origin of religion we cannot overlook mentioning the theory held by the French socialogical school which upholds the view that totemism is the most elementary from of religion. The most prominent representative of this school is Emil Durkheim whose view is very elaborately presented in his monumental work "The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life."

I cannot better express Durkheim's theory in so limited space as this than to quote Edwards who has compacted it in his valuable work "The Philosophy of Religion." "The substratum of all religious belief," he says, "lies in the idea of a mysterious impersonal force controling life, and this sense of force is derived from the authority of society over the individual. It is this sense of the power of the social group over his life that become to man the consciousness of mysterious power in the world. The totem is the visible emblem of this power; but the reality behind the totem, which the totem symbolizes, is the might of tribal custom, emotion, and thought, which seems like an actually existing force weighing upon each individual and dominating his life. His real god is society; the poser he really worship is the power of society."[12]

As we see from this account, the basis of Durkheim's theory is that it is the society itself with its controlling force over the individual that gave rise to rites and cere-

monies of a religious character.

All these various theories which I have roughly tried to outline, although they vary in the ways of approaching the subject, agree on two points. (1) There is no particular religious instince or sense or anything in man that can explain the emergence of religious consciousness. Man is merely passive in this matter. There is nothing in man active in explaining the religious phenomena; (2) it is the society itself and the objective conditions, then, they assert, that can explain, partially or wholly, the origin of religion in man.

It is, indeed, true that from the time when man is awakened from subhuman stages to human, he is already a social being, everything he has can be said to have been obtained as the result of the interaction between the individual and his environment. It is inconceivable that man could have become anything if he had veen born in a vacuum-like world where there is nothing in his enveronment which would reach his senses. It is inconceivable also that a human being itself could have come into existence in such an environment as this. As a matter of fact, man is the child of his environment. In this sense everything he has, he owes to his environment. We cannot explain him apart from it. Not only religion, therefore, but everything he has, art, philosophy etc. are social

products.

However, our problem is to determine whether or not, he, once having emerged from the subhuman to the human in the given environment, has some inborn tendency which would necessarily produce something that can be called religious.

Religion is not something that has appeared in human society already separate and distince from other phases of human activity, definite in form and content. Ther has been a very slow and gradual, almost unrecognizable, process of development. And the ways of primitive people, i.e. customs and traditions which have become to them something they ought to revere and obey, and those things which they regarded as valuable for the sustenance and satisfaction of their life, must have had very much to do in the genesis and development of religion. For religion, after all, subjectively speaking, is our attitude toward something supernatural, blending reverence, obedience, value, and other mental attitudes of this sort. And the elements which go to make that religious attitude, primitive man experienced when he was confronted with the customs and traditions and life values of the tribe. And he might have worshipped these, or their totality, as Durkheim thinks, through ritual and ceremonies, mistaking them for gods or God. But whatever the conditions that led him to such an attitude and practice might have been, the fact that there was in him the capability to respond to such a situation as that

is the significant thing. This capability at least was his as an individual. If it was the objective conditions and the group life that inspired in him the religious consciousness, it was he that had the capability of being inspired. Action cannot work where there is no reaction. And reaction is a kind of action. Reaction is an active element in human life. It is not a mere mechanical process. Man does not react unless he acts. Religion, then, is not mere reflexive action. It is a conscious active process. If it is an attitude, as Dr. King holds, which we organize from our inner dispositions and tendencies it is an active organization.

Again if we hold with Ames the view that it is the desires and needs in man that were the springs of religion we might convincingly affirm that the impetus or driving power to make man religious is innate. Although the desires and needs are not in themselves religious in the begining they were at least conditions that would sooner or later lead him to create religion. Otherwise thay would have never become the impetus in man to produce religion.

Furthermore, although the concrete religious form might appear in and through society, there might be in man a certain craving that can only be satisfied in religion. This craving, like other desires and veeds is innate. The craving, the yearning, which led the Hebrew psalmist to break into the earnest utterance:

As the hart panteth after the water brooks,
So panteth my soul after thee, O God.
My soul thirsteth for God, for the living God:
When shall I come and appear before God?

is the same craving and yearning that must have driven the most primitive man in his seeking for and groping after the eternal Love. A helpless child, by nature, desires its mother. A youth by nature years for one of the opposite sex. He is constituted that way. It is his nature. So is man related to religion, to God. As the tree grows toward the sun by nature, so does man, whether individually or socially, go onward and upward to ward the Unseen Sun of his soul.

However, because of the indefinite differentiation of life's activities in primitive society, the craving was mingled with other desires and needs and appeared in crude ritual and ceremonies in terms of ordinary life activities such as hunting and food-getting etc. But the fact that the religious practices were separated from other workaday phases of life and was considered sacred gives ground to infer that even though it was connected with workaday activities in ritual, it was the craving for something beyond food and shelter, something which is sacred. Why did primitive man make out of the self-same stuff, one a profane, the other a sacred, object, or act? If the actual hunting and picking fruits were ordinary workaday affairs, there is no reason why the drama of those activities should become sacred to him. If the drama was sacred to him, the actual scene must have been more

sacred. But in reality it was not. Must not the ritual, the content of which was nothing else than the reproducing of the ordinary life procedure, then, have been the effort of primitive people to reach out for some reality other than the necessities of physical life? Does it not tell us that they were aware, though very vaguely, of the Sacred, the Sacred One whom they were longing for and trying to communicate with? Since man is from the first a social being, and religion is a part of his entire life, something which grows from his life as a whole, it is inevetable for him to express his craving in and through society, and by means of his workaday life. And yet because it is expressed in the social life it cannot be said that it is necessarily a purely social product. We cannot explain religion apart from social influence. But at the same time it cannot be explained apart from the individual inborn tendency either.

There is such a thing as social psychology which holds the view that when individuals meet together each experiences an unusual mental activity which he alnne could not possibly have. This we experience too and do not and cannot deny. Durkheim bases his theory entirely on this. And yet we must admit the fact that no matter how different the group consciousnesses is from the individual consciousness, it is action and reaction of individual consciousnesses that results in the production of the so-called group consciousness. In this

sense, then, we might, not unreasonably, maintain that the basis of the group consciousness is the numerous individual consciousnesses, although the group consciousness is always more than the totality of individual consciousnesses. How can there be a group consciousness apart from individual consciousnesses?

There is great truth in Robertson Smith's theory that religion is based on the sense of kinship. For if religion is one's dealing with some supernatural object, real or imagined, it is the sense of kinship that makes him congenial with, and attracts to, that object. Without this sense, therefore, no religion could come into existence. It is the sense of kinship thatbecomes the impetus in his heart to crave and yearn for the Infinite, the Perfect, the Lover.

However, although the sense of kinship is produced, if not awakened, through the contact with his fellowmen and with the religious object, the congeniality or the kinship with his fellowmen and the religious object inhere in the individual experience, without which no sense of kinship could emerge in him.

We conclude, then, although religion could not have come into existence without the intervention of society, it could not have come without an innate something in the individual either It would be most reasonable, therfore, to hold with Professor Pratt that "the inborn nature of the individual

determines what might be called the form of his religious life. The matter is chiefly the contribution of society."[13]

IV. THE SENSE OF THE SACRED AND THE RELIGIOUS OBJECT

Religion is the phase of the life activities of man which has fundamentally to do with some superhuman power or being, real or imagined. Religion, as such, is a human life process, spontaneous, natural and inevitable. As a life-process, it has relation to the whole man - his emotional, intellectual and volitional life, and all of them together.

However, this does not mean that it is to be identified with any other of the human life-activities, such as morality, philosophy, art etc. Although it is included in our life-activity, and is related to the whole man, it is a distinct aspect of life which is not coincident with other forms of life. There is a specific feature in religion which is its unique property that makes religion religion. Other elements, indeed, are not wanting. They are, however, secondary, consequently non-essential. From the primitive ages men so clearly found and experienced this specific feature in religion that, with great discretion, they set apart religion and things which pertain to it, from the ordinary affairs of life. What is it, then, that differentiates religion from other activities of life such as morality, philosophy, science and art?

In our moral life we have the sense of duty in whose presence we almost bow our heads, and yet in whose presence, again, we become most assertive. In our speculative life

we are stirred by strong curiousity or the desire for the ultimate knowledge, or reality. The impulse which underlies our scientific activity is to get accurate knowledge of the structure and workings of nature. The appreciation of beauty manifested in colors, forms and sounds, is the fundamental attitude we have toward art. What, then, do we experience, what sort of attitude and consciousness do we have, when we enter into the kingdom of religion? Indeed what we experience in our religious life is not so simple that it can easily be reduced to a single element. However, we can at least single out some of the most characteristic and essential elements in what we experience in religious life. What are these?

The first in the modern era who made the attempt to study religion scientifically, i.e. by an analytical method, is Schleiermacher. Over against bare intellectualism, lifeless dogmatism, and self-assertive moralism, he defined religion in terms of feeling, which, he thought, to be the basis of religion.

According to Schleiermacher, "Religion in its essential nature is neither a form of knowledge nor a form of activity, but a determination of feeling or of immediate self-consciousness. The common element in all the varied utterances of religion, which immediately differentiates it from other feelings and constitutes the invariable essence of religion, is that

in it we are conscious of our absolute dependence, or in other words, of our relation with God."[1]

As is shown in this statement, Schleiermacher emancipated religion from dogma and morality and set it on the inmost part of man's heart, namely, the seat where selfood is consciously felt, where knowledge is guided and unified, and our action is approved or vetoed. He made religion stand on its own footing. He opened for us a direct way to the holy of holies to which we can reach without any meddling of elaborate hierarchy of knowledge or cumbersome system of laws of action. It is directly felt in the heart; hence it is immediate and not second-hand. Religion gains reality and vitality through feeling or emotion. Thus, in pointing out religion as based upon feeling, he rendered a great service to religion.

However, his definition of religion hardly escapes criticism when it is carefully examined. In the first place, although feeling may be the dominant note in our religious experience, it is not the only element in it. However meagre and insignificant, other elements exist. They are no less important in our religious experience. As a matter of fact, so far as our religious experience goes, we are aware of the Reality, vague or definite, which surrounds and penetrates us, before our feeling is stirred. Without the awareness of the Reality, feeling would never be aroused. We have seen that primitive man's feeling was stirred only when he was aware of the mysterious power. The awareness of something,

or some being, then, is simultaneous with, if not prior to, the feeling. "There is no such thing as mere feeling." says Professor Baillie, "pure feeling....is pure nonsence."[2]

In the course of religious development, the more or less vague awareness became so much clearer and more definite that it became cognition, and from cognition passed to belief. We see, then, that religious belief, in its genesis, is not, the mere artificial creation of man. It is a spontaneous growth from man's deep religious experience. It becomes lifeless dogma only when it is handed down without being revitalized in the transmiter's inner experiences. Belief, then, is neither an excrescence nor the mere outward shell of religion. It is as much essential to religion as is feeling. Feeling, then, is not the only element in religion, as Schleiermacher conceived it to be.

Furthermore feeling is not always necessarily religious. Indeed, Schleiermacher modified the feeling into that of absolute dependence. However, the feeling of dependence, even when absolute, is not always necessarily, religious. A helpless baby might have the feeling of absolute dependence upon its mother. And yet that can hardly be called a religion. A man wrecked at sea might have the feeling of absolute dependence while clinging to a part of the boat. And yet this is not religion. In order that a feeling be a religious one, therefore, the sense of dependence, even when absolute, is not enough. There must also be other very important factor

whose nature we shall see later.

There is a very strong tendency in the modern age to seek the roots of religion neither in belief nor in feeling but in the sense of duty. The most important, if not the first, exponent of this theory is the great figure in the thought world, Immanuel Kant. He starts his theory of religion, i.e. the doctrines of immortality and God, from the idea of the categorical imperative. The categorical imperative, the practical reason, as he calls, needs and must postulate the immortal life. Only in case we are immortal is unlimited moral development possible. And it is only as God exists that the fullest attainment of the summum bonum is conceivable. Our moral life becomes religious when we consider the moral laws given to us as divine commands. "The moral laws," he says, "lead through the conception of the summum bonum as the object and final end of pure practical reason to religion, that is, to the recognition of all duties as divine commands, not as sanctions, that is to say, arbitrary ordinances of a foreign will....but as essential laws of every free will which must be regarded as commands of the Supreme Being."[3]

Later he reaches to the conception that the idea of God is immediately given in man with the moral will, i.e. the categorical imperative. He says, "God is not a being outside me, but merely a thought in me. God is the morally

practical self-legislative Reason. Therefore only a God in me, about me, and over me."[4] So much so that he almost identified the moral will with God himself as is shown in the sentence, "God must be represented not as substance outside me, but as the highest moral principle in me."[5]

It follows, then, that for Kant religion is practically identical with obeying our duty-imperative. For him religious consciousness is nothing else than moral will. In the words of Weber; For Kant "religion is true only when completely identical with morality. Religion within the bounds of reason consists in morality, nothing more nor less."[6]

In emphasizing duty, the practical good life, he rendered a great service to religion at a time when religion was identified either with cold intellectualism or with hazy feeling which is doomed, in the end, to evaporate in "a land of fog and cloud," in the words of Dr. Baillie. In his enthusiastic advocacy of the nobleness of our moral life, whose ultimate goal is the 'summum bonum', the moral fervor and the persuasiveness of the prophets of Israel and Judah is re-echoed. This moral note is the essential thing which underlies the thought of the Apostles and also is the foundation stone of Christianity, the highest religion. Furthermore, we see that in the history of religion, when the moral life decayed the religious life also lost its vitality and turned into a mere formalism. It became salt which had lost its savor and a

candle without light. All this shows how essential morality is in religion. So we do not hesitate to hail Kant as one of the greatest of moral philosophers.

However, Kant's position cannot be accepted without tempering in the same furnace of criticism. In the first place, it is not difficult to note that although he thought he based religion on a firm foundation, namely, the categorical imperative, unfortunately that foundation is not so firm a one as he supposed it to be. For moral consciousness is not of itself religion, nor does it necessarily lead to religion. Morality is fundamentally confined in range to man. It is the right relationship between man and man. There is no logical or organic relationship between morality and religion. If there is, it is by mutual consent and voluntary marriage. Neverthless the relationship is not less vital. For "they are no more two but one," being con-joined together by God Himself, the eternal Peace-Maker, that "no man may put assunder."

Again, as Kant well pointed out, in the moral consciousness God is a mere postulate and nothing more. He is not immediately and directly felt and experienced in our moral consciousness. Tenthousand cartloads of duties and their performance would neither show us God nor suggest the idea of God. Kant regards duties as divine commands. However, there is no causal ground to conceive of duties as divine commands. If divine sanction was ever attached to human duties, it is, in

the nature of the case, a supperimposed one, and not one that is intrinsically inherent in their nature.

Moreover, our moral consciousness, which in its nature demands uncurbed moral autonomy, does not call for support from superhuman power. The most characteristic note of the moralist is self-assertiveness. If he seeks help from outside, he is no longer a moralist. On the contrary the dominant note of religion is humility and self-abasement. Hence so long as our moral self-assertiveness persists, no religion could be engendered in us. It is only when this attitude is frustrated, that "to such belongeth the kingdom of heaven." Perhaps this is why primitive Buddhism, the religion of moralism, is a religion of atheism. The only way of acheiving life's goal in Buddhism is to "work out your own salvation," the last words Buddha left at his death. There is no place for divine help or grace in original Buddhism.

Consequently, moralism is bound to become Humanism. "What is God for in human society? Man is the Master of all. Do away with God, who makes us slaves instead of making us free citizen of the universe." Such are the outcries of modern Humanists. But are we satisfied with Humanism? Is human goodness itself, meagre and half-shaped, the adquate fulfiller and comforter of infinite human aspiration for the Eternal Goodness and Righteousness? Isn't human goodness, however noble and great, "but dust and ashes" in the presence of the Eternal, the Perfect?

So long as a moralist remains a moralist, he is lost. He is "severed from Christ, and fallen away from grace," from religion. It is only when morality returns to its home, the Father, that it will have that abundant life which beareth much fruit.

We conclude, then, that moral consciousness is not religious consciousness in the strictest sense. Nor does it engender religious consciousness, although a happy union of the two is not impossible.

There is another theory of religion which is in vogue in modern times. This is what we might call the "value theory," which regards religious consciousness as the "valuational attitude," or religion as the belief in the "conservation of values." This theory has direct relation with Kant's theory of ethics.

According to this theory, "the conservation of value is the characteristic axiom of religion."[7] Now "the value denotes the property possessed by a thing either of confering immediate satisfaction or serving as a means procuring it."[8] Value, then, naturally presupposes human needs and purposes. These and their satisfaction are the determining factors of valuation. Religion is nothing else than "the endeavor to securethe conservation....of values through specific actions that are believed to evoke some agency different from the ordinary ego of the individual, or from other merely human be-

ing, and that imply a feeling of dependence upon them."[9] Religion as such is the way to satisfy human needs. The divine beings in religion are "mere means to ends, the ends being eompletely determined....without reference to gods."[10] "Religious consciousness often involves, sometimes supremely is, a consciousness of ends or values."[11] Religious consciousness as value consciousness, then, is not essentially different from other sorts of value consciousness, such as we have in art, in ethics and in knowledge etc. The only difference is that while other values are departmental and are concerned only with specific values, "religion is interested in all values, in the whole meaning of life."[12] It aims at the completion, unification, and conservation of values in our life as a whole. It tries to find "the value of values," by the process of revaluing of all the values of life conserving those values found "in the conviction that no values perish." "It will thus be seen," then, in the words of Höffding, "that in its innermost essence religion is concerned not with the comprehension, but with the valuation of existence, and the religious ideas express the relation in which actual existence, as we know it, stands to that which, for us, invests life with its highest value."[13]

This theory, indeed, has great truth which we cannot overlook. By defining religion in terms of value, it renders a great service in making it have vital relation with

our life as a whole. It makes us to see that religion, as the way to meet our fundamental and highest needs, is indispensable for attaining the abundant life. By defining religion in terms of value, it also shows us the fact that it "is not a merely departmental function of life, marked off sharply from the provinces of ethics, art, science, and philosophy, and the secular pursuits of daily life....but it pervades all interests and sweeps all life into its orbit."[14]

However, there are weaknesses in this theory that are fatal to religion. (1) If religion has to do only with those values commonly known to us, namely, truth, goodness and beauty, if there is no specific value of its own in religion, what fundamental difference is there between religion and other phases of life? Religion as such is not different in kind from philosophy, morality etc. It follows, then, that morality, philosophy etc. at their best are nothing else than religion. In the last resort, then, it leads to the conclusion that, morality is religion; philosophy is religion; science is also religion; art too is religion. All is religion. Is this theory acceptable?

To be sure, religion aims, as is asserted, at the completion, unification, and conservation of values in our life. But if religion is to do all this it must have a certain principle distinct from those values that it deals with, which this theory does not propose. (2) When we start religion from value-consciousness, would it not, not necessarily,

but very possibly, lead us to Humanism, a religion without God? For, for some people God is not their supreme value. For them human values are their God and their summum bonum. Indeed, religion as value-consciousness is comprehehsive enough to cover even non-theistic humanitarianism. But are we satisfied with this? This theory, then, although it has valuable merits, is not satisfactory for explaining the essence of religious consciousness.

In the foregoing paragraphs we have examined some of the leading theories about religion and found that although they contain elements of truth they are onesided and overlook the most essential factor in religious consciousness and so are not satisfactory. Religion is the attitude of the whole man toward some Reality outside us. As such it is concerned with our whole mental life. Hence any theory of religious consciousness ought to be comprehensive enough to include all the possible elements in it. However, our purpose at present, is to describe, not the entire workings of mind, but the unique element in our religious life, without which religion cannot exist.

What, then, is this unique element in our religious consciousness? The history of religion shows that from remote ages man made a sharp distinction between things which pertain to religion and things profane. And for the protection of religious things, they made a law of tabu. What, then, is

the principle that underlies the workings of the mind which makes such a distinction as that? It is nothing else then the sense of the sacred which Dr. Otto so admirably and convincingly set forth in his work "The Idea of the Holy." This sense of the sacred is the distinctive feature which we feel only in our religious life. It is the heart or soul of religion without which no religion can exist. It is the unique element in religion which cannot be identified with any other category of value such as goodness, beauty and truth.

Let us, then, engage in finding out what the nature of this sense of the sacred is. It would be well, however, to elucidate first what the word stands for with a view to determining its nature. The word 'sacred' is difined in the Century Dictionary as 'of, or pertaining to, religion or divine things.' As such it is 'opposed to secular or profane.' It means 'setting apart' something from ordinary and common affairs of life, not to be mingled with them.

Without going into a technical explanation, then, the meaning is already clear. The whole interpretation of the word shows us that it is a state which is totally distinguished from our ordinary life and things.

It is clear from this fact, then, that the primary character of 'sacredness' is its exclusiveness or otherliness. It does not allow any other thing which does not pertain to it lightly to come in contact with it. One, there-

fore, who deals with the sacred thing, or being, or person, should, first of all, consecrate himself before he gets in touch with it. Otherwise the wrath which proceeds from it would fall upon him who violates it. The primitive man considered the wrath to be of a physical character, but the modern man thinks of it in spiritual terms. This character of exclusiveness is well expressed in the laws of tabu among premitive peoples.

There is also in it an element which arouses in us the feeling of awefulness. This feeling is not an ordinary kind of fear. It denotes a quite specific kind of emotional response when we confront the sacred. Read the description of the vision which Isaiah saw in the temple:

> In the year that king Uzziah died I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne, high and lifted up; and his train filled the temple. Above him stood the seraphim: each one had six wings; with twain he covered his face, and with twain he covered his feet, and with twain he did fly. And one cried unto another, and said, Holy, holy, holy, is Jehovah of hosts: the whole earth is full of his glory. And the foundations of the thresholds shook at the voice of him that cried, and the house was filled with smoke. Then, said I, Woe is me! for I am undone; because I am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips: for mine eyes have seen the King, Jehovah of hosts.(Isaiah 6:1-5)

How awful the scene is! Even reading the description makes us tremble with the feeling of awfulness. "And the foundations of the threshold shook at the voice of him that cried, and the house filled with smoke." It is thiselement that makes us bow down before the sacred.

The sacredness also has the element of mysteriousness. It is so deeply hidden in the holy of holies that we are struck with the feeling of mysteriousness. As Dr. Otto well denotes it, it is ineffable and unfathomable.

There is in it an element that calls forth in us a reverential spirit. When Moses trod the "holy ground,"(Ex. 3) he was bidden to put off his shoes - asign of reverence in the orient in the presence of a respectful person, or a god.

Beside all this there is in it an element, opposite to the first named above, i.e. exclusiveness, which draws and attracts us to itself. As Dr. Otto says this is "something that entraces him(i.e. the worshipper)....something that captivates him with a strange ravishment, rising often enough to the pitch of dizzy intoxication."[15] It is this element that drives us to desire and yearn for it. "Possession of and by the numen(the sacred) becomes an end in itself; it begins to be sought for its own sake,"[16] because in it there is an element which Otto calls, that of "fascination." Men and women of old, not infrequently, practiced abstinence, tortured their bodies, went lonely places, confined themselves in cells. Besides they "had trial of mocking and scourgings, yea, moreover of bonds and imprinsonment....were stoned, were sawn asunder, ...slain with the sward: went about....being destitute, afflicted, ill-treated, wandering in deserts and mountains and caves," because there is in the sacred something that attracted

them. fascinated them, something which, they thought, was worth the risk even of their life.

CONCLUSION

In our study of religious consciousness, however, there is another element which we must not overlook for a comprehensive understanding of religion. This is nothing else than the idea of some divine being which is presented in the religious consciousness. As a matter fact the sense of the sacred is not one that is self-generating but one that is aroused by the awareness of the objective divine being. Without this objective divine being, therefore, no sense of the sacred could come into existence.

However, the history of religion shows that although every religious subject or tribe has the idea of some sort of religious object, the character of the idea of the object was not always the same. Different tribes or people and the different ages had different ideas of god. Its range swings from the crude materialistic, childish one to a refined and spiritual one. We have seen that primitive man believed in mana which is supernatural and mysterious and yet non-moral in character, which aroused in him the sense of the sacred, of awe and reverence. The human race, starting from this primitive rudimentary conception of mysterious power, at length reached "the One, the Righteous, the Holy, the Good, the Perfect, 'our Father who art in Heaven,'"[17] In this process it had to pass through countless ups and downs as is shown in the history of religion. Sometimes the natural ob-

jects around were conceived as gods and sacrifices were offered to them. At times men were dismayed by the host of spirits in the world, and by means of elaborate rituals and ceremonies tried to win their favor. There came a time when one or a few gods were chosen which were supposed to be the patron or patrons of the tribe or nation. All these ideas of god, inadquate and crude as they were, served for a time to give satisfaction to the worshippers.

And yet they were not adquate to satisfy ultimate human needs. They are too crude, too materialistic, too childish to satisfy man's highest aspiration. Some of them were too immoral to serve as an ideal for the growing moral person. Again some of them were too particularistic and too local to be the object of veneration and adoration of mankind as a whole. In order that a religious object may be a worthy one it must be free from all these limitations, imperfections and crudities.

In contrast to these conceptions, the object of worship must be (1) universal and not particularistic. A particularistic god or gods cannot, in the nature of the case, meet the ultimate human needs. For a particularistic god is a selfish god, a war god, who has inevitable limitation in location, in knowledge and in moral nature. As a matter of fact he is not superior to the worshipper. A religious object which is worthy of veneration and worship of mankind must be universal.

(2) It must be the unifying principle of the seeming multiple universe including our human life. In other words it must be the sole controling world-ground which saves the world from being a chaotic one. When a religious object is not such it cannot be a worthy object of worship. Worship of, and dependence on, this sort of object mean a loss of unification in the world and in human life. When the world loses the principle of unification what a tragic one it proves to be! Human life loses its significance. History becomes a chain of meaningless incidents.

(3) It must be worthy of being our highest moral ideal. If a religious object is non-moral or immoral it cannot be the object of our worship. Man is essentially a moral being. As moral being his goal is moral perfection. Any religious object, therefore, which is short of an adquate human moral ideal cannot be a worthy religious object.

(4) It must have vital relationship with man. The goal of religious life is communion or union with the religious object. Communion or union is fundamentally conditioned by the kinship between the two subjects of fellowship. A religious object which has no vital relationship with man, therefore, has nothing vitally to do with our religious life.

(5) Finally, the object of worship must be a Person. A mere abstract principle is not satisfying, however profound, for the religious life. Neitner super-person, nor sub-person

can be an adquate religious object. A religious object should be one in whose presence we can not merely bow our heads, but also be on friendly terms. It must be our Friend, our Companion. To be a Friend and Companion it must be a Person who feels, wills and thinks, who can sympathize with us, who can help and console us in the time of tribulation and anguish, who can guide us when we are lost in the forest of difficulties and perplexities.

Where can men find such a religious object? Not in the gods of primitive people, not in the gods of great religions today. The god of Hinduism is too impersonal and too separate from our human life; the god of Mohammedanism is too arbitrary and too inconsistent in character. The God of Judaism is the most satisfactory among all the religious objects, yet, as the followers of Judaism regard Him, He is too exclusive, particularistc and transcendent. Exclusiveness and particularism are the fundamental weaknesses in Judaism.

It is only when we come to the God whom Jesus revealed in his person, whom he called "My Father and your Father," that we meet the worthiest object for our religious life. The God whom Jesus revealed is the Creator, and Father of mankind, who is all perfect, all loving, all wise, who is free from all limitations and finitude. He transcends our world of time and space and yet He is in the universe, controling and directing it. Especially does He care for every

individual as parents do for their child.

The God whom Jesus taught and revealed, is, therefore, the only one that can satisfy both heart and mind.

N O T E S

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1. Pratt, J. B., Op. cit., pp. 3, 4, 5.
2. Tiele, C. P., The Outline of the History of Religion, p. 6.
3. D'Alviella, Origin and Growth of the Conception of God, p. 126, as quoted by G. T. Ladd in The Philosophy of Religion, p. 126.
4. Hebrew 11.
5. Buckham, J. W., Religion as Experience, pp. 22, 23.

II

1. Marett, R. R., The Threshold of Religion, pp. 203ff.
2. Ibid., Introduction, xxiv.
3. This method isexactly what Dr. Marett employed, as is suggested in the quotation cited above when he says, "they(the cave paintings)bear a close analogy to those sacred designs which the Australians employ to-day in their Magico-religious ceremonies."
4. Tylor, E. B., Primitive Culture, vol. I, p. 424.
5. Ibid., Vol. I., p. 426.
6. Ibid., Vol. II., p. 234.
7. Marett, Threshold, Introduction, p. xxxi.
8. Op. cit. p. 17.
9. Edwards, D. M., The Philosophy of Religion, p. 37.
10. Frazer, J. G., The Golden Bough, abridged edition, p. 50.
11. Ibid., p. 51.
12. Ibid., p. 57.
13. Marett, Op. cit. p. xi
14. This power is designated by various names by different savage people: Manitou by Algonquin tribes; Orenda by the Iroquoian tribes; Wakonda by the Sioux, etc. All these, however, point to the same power.
15. The Melanesians, p. 119, as quoted by Marett, Threshold, pp. 104, 105.
16. Marett, Op. cit., pp. 1, 2.
17. Ency. Brit., (11th edition), art. Religion.
18. Marett, Op. cit., p. x.

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1. Irving King, The Development of Religion, p. 30.
2. Ibid., pp. 45, 46.
3. Ibid., p. 30.
4. Ibid., p. 36.
5. Ames, E. S., Religion, p. 9.

6. See Ames' The Psychology of Religious Experience, pp. 45ff.
7. Ames, Religion, p. 8.
8. Ames, The Psychology of Religious Experience, p. 49.
9. Ames, Religion, p. 12.
10. Lectures on the Religion of the Semites, p. 47.
11. Ibid., p. 287.
12. Edwards, D. M., The Philosophy of Religion, p. 43.
13. Pratt, J. B., The Religious Consciousness, p. 74.

IV

1. Edward, K., Religious Experience: Its Nature and Truth, pp. 7, 8.
2. Baillie, J., The Roots of Religion in the Human Soul, p. 77.
3. Green, T. M., Kant, Selections, p. 365.
4. Ibid., p. 374.
5. Ibid., p. 374.
6. Weber and Perry, History of Philosophy, p. 329.
7. Höffding, H., The Philosophy of Religion, p. 10.
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10. Coe, G. A., The Psychology of Religion, p. 63.
11. Ibid., p. 65.
12. Ibid., p. 75.
13. Höffding, Op. cit. p. 6.
14. Edwards, D. M., Christianity and Philosophy, p. 48.
15. R. Otto, The Idea of the Holy, p. 31.
16. Ibid., p. 33
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